Are business schools equipping the leaders of tomorrow with the skills they’ll need to face a number of urgent global challenges?
From climate change and resource scarcity to inequality, the business world is shifting rapidly and business leaders need to understand and tackle these in a transparent way. Yet business schools often fail to address sustainability at all, or address it only as a separate, niche add-on to the course.
In this podcast our panel of experts discuss, and disagree over, whether business schools are lagging behind on integrating sustainability in their curricula and explore what makes good business leaders able to respond to complex sustainability challenges. They also discuss Nespresso’s competition, which challenged MBA students to tackle a very practical sustainability problem.
Ioannis Ioannou, assistant professor of strategy and entrepreneurship, London Business School.
Polly Courtice, Cambridge Institute for Sustainable Leadership.
David Grayson, director of the Doughty School for Corporate Responsibility, Cranfield School of Management.
Why are corporate executives obsessed with growing their companies?
Growth is innately appealing. We all feel better when we are making and selling more than we used to. Growth provides opportunities for people to develop new skills and gain promotions. And growing is a lot more fun than downsizing – no-one likes making people redundant, or killing off money-losing projects.
But the trouble is, most executives seek to grow their companies faster than the natural rate of growth in their markets – often many times faster. “Double digit growth” is a commonly-heard goal. And this is where things become interesting, because faster-than-market growth means you are either taking share away from competitors, or you are moving into new market areas – both of which are pretty risky things to do. So why do corporate executives do this?
Consider a well-known example. McDonalds was a growth company for about fifty years, from its origins in post-war America through to its position as the global leader in fast-food restaurants in the late 1990s. But things started to go wrong – the company was feeling the heat from the healthy-food lobby, and had over-extended itself with too many new stores. There was no natural growth left in McDonald’s part of the fast-food market. In 1999 it made its first ever job cuts and closed some money-losing restaurants. It then embarked on a series of acquisitions into adjacent areas: Chipotle, Aroma Café, Donotas Pizza, and Boston Market, as well as a 33% stake in Pret a Manger.
But none of these new businesses helped at all. The company reported its first-ever quarterly loss in 2002. A new team was brought in, and the “I’m Loving it” campaign, launched in 2003, helped to refocus on the core business, and this business returned to profitability. The non-core businesses were gradually sold off, but a lot of money and executive attention was wasted in the process of experimenting with them.
Why did McDonalds’ executives pursue this ill-advised foray into other fast-food areas? Essentially, they were incentivised to do it. The stock market puts a high premium on growth stocks, so it was in these executives’ interests to continue to push for growth even though their market was mature and crowded. And they also believed they would succeed – most executives have strong self-belief, so the guys running McDonalds would have been confident they could beat the odds as they diversified into related business areas, even if many before them had failed.
So what is the alternative? A much better approach is to be honest about what you are good at, and to keep on doing it better than anyone else. Put yourself in the shoes of McDonald’s shareholders for a minute: they didn’t want the management team to dabble in new business areas in 1999; they wanted Mcdonald’s to be the best burger restaurant in the world, and to make lots of money doing it. Of course, this isn’t as sexy a strategy as trying out new formats and acquiring companies in adjacent markets, but it’s actually a much smarter long term bet.
The bottom line is that growth strategies are often pursued for the wrong reasons. There is a delicate tension between what shareholders really want from their CEOs and what CEOs find alluring. It is often claimed that executives are only pushing for growth to satisfy their shareholders demands, but actually this is not correct. Shareholders are very good at differentiating between the shares they buy for growth, and the ones they buy for their dividend. McDonald’s is a mature, well-run company, generating good cashflows. Shareholders don’t want their management teams to take excessive risks, they are content with a steady and predictable performance in line with the market.
Over the past few decades, several countries around the world have experienced unprecedented economic development as measured by unceasingly accelerating GDP growth rates. This explosive growth, however, has also led to overconsumption or even destruction of natural resources, and to an overwhelming and unsustainable increase in greenhouse gas emissions. The ensuing impacts of global warming and climate change have severely damaged the planet’s capacity to sustain human development. According to current estimates by the World Wildlife Fund ([WWF] 2012), by 2050, when the earth’s population is expected to reach 9 billion, we will need as many as three planets to sustain current levels of consumption.
Beyond the negative environmental consequences, this type of economic growth has generated several pressing social issues: ever-increasing income inequality; often uncontrollable urbanization; high unemployment rates, particularly within the younger segments of the population; and social immobility leading to social instability, and even social unrest, around the world (e.g., the Occupy movement). This is especially evident when one considers the proliferation of NGOs and their increasing demands and expectations of companies, governments, and transnational institutions. Or when one considers that, according to Oxfam (2014), currently the world’s 85 richest individuals own as much wealth as does the bottom half of the entire global population. In other words, we are witnessing a potential erosion of the social fabric across countries, despite our collective ability to produce more goods and services than ever before.
Meanwhile, in the business world, multiple corporate scandals, coupled with the recent dire crisis of the financial system itself, the numerous environmental disasters directly attributed to companies’ operations (e.g., the BP oil spill), and even the resulting and regrettable loss of human life due to compromised health and safety standards (e.g., the Savar building collapse in Bangladesh, suicides at Foxconn), have severely undermined the public’s trust in the modern business organization, and demands for transparency and accountability, as well as fierce debates on the broader role of the corporation within civil society, have begun to emerge.
These formidable environmental and social forces, in conjunction with the inherent pathologies of the capitalist system itself (e.g., short-termism), have threatened—or, in some instances, completely eradicated—the corporations’ traditional “license to operate”. Executives therefore now struggle to identify and prioritize their non-shareholding stakeholders and to understand the boundaries of their corporations’ responsibility. Thus, they face significant challenges when mapping a strategic course for their organizations within a fundamentally unfamiliar and fast-evolving environmental and social context. And they need to do this while also managing the more traditional and perhaps relatively better-understood economic context and meeting demands for financial profitability. Yet such demands, at least in the short term, may well directly conflict with actions they need to take to meet the expectations of their non-shareholding stakeholders—such as employees, local communities, or the environment.
These are both pressing and daily preoccupations for CEOs globally. The 2013 UN Global Compact–Accenture CEO study (Accenture, 2014) found that 97% of the 1,000 CEOs interviewed across 103 countries and 27 industries see sustainability as important to the future success of their business, and that 78% see sustainability as an opportunity for growth and innovation. Notably, 84% of the CEOs believe that business should lead efforts to define and deliver sustainable development goals, and 79% of them see sustainability as a route to competitive advantage in their industry.
From a strategy point of view, therefore, accounting for or even integrating environmental and social issues into a company’s business model, processes, and operations introduces critical new elements in the continuing quest to understand what drives persistent performance heterogeneity across firms over time—the question at the heart of strategy research. In this article, I suggest that the boundary of what constitutes corporate performance is being extended beyond the traditional financial (profitability) metrics to include environmental, social, ethical, and corporate governance metrics (i.e., what are termed ESG dimensions). Moreover, I suggest that the long-term persistence of superior performance no longer depends exclusively on the management of the economic context. Instead, it requires an integrated approach in terms of concurrently managing the social and the environmental context, thus delivering value both to shareholders and to non-shareholding stakeholders in a synergistic manner.
Specifically, I first examine how strategy is defined and conceptualized through the eyes of the main schools of thought and the leading strategy scholars. I find that such definitions and resulting conceptualizations predominantly focus on financial metrics as measures of performance, and they provide guidance mainly on how to manage a corporation’s economic context. Next, I consider the literature on externalities and corporate social responsibility (CSR) to understand how environmental and social issues have been integrated. I find that despite the important insights generated by these literatures, they still suffer from what Edward Freeman and others term “the separation fallacy”: the notion that no business decision has ethical content or an implicit ethical point of view, or that no ethical decision has content or any implicit view of value creation and business. In other words, these literatures explore social and environmental performance either in isolation or by assuming a strong form of independence from financial performance and traditional notions of strategy formulation, thus failing to provide a holistic and integrated understanding of strategy.
In sum, in this article I characterize a clear gap in our understanding of the fundamental strategic problem in the age of sustainability and social responsibility. I highlight the rather urgent need for rigorous research around the phenomenon itself, as well as its theoretical implications for strategy as an academic field of inquiry. After reflecting upon the state of the field today, I offer an extended definition (i.e., a reconceptualization) of strategy, and I reference empirical evidence for the emergence of the “sustainable organization”—a distinct type of the modern corporation that effectively and profitably integrates environmental and social issues into its strategy. Finally, I briefly suggest fruitful avenues for future research.
Full Essay/Op-Ed available here.
When something seems too good to be true, it usually is. And management techniques, practices, and strategies are no different. When you read a business book or attend a presentation on a particular management practice, it is a good habit to explicitly ask “what might it not be good for?” When might it not work; what could be its drawbacks? If the presenter’s answer is “there are none”, a healthy dose of skepticism is warranted.
Because that’s unfortunately not how life works, and that’s not how organizations work. It relates to what Michael Porter meant with being “stuck in the middle”: if you try to come up with a strategy that does everything for everyone, you will likely end up achieving nothing. If you focus your strategy on, for instance, achieving low costs, you will likely have to sacrifice delivering superior value on other dimensions, and vice versa.
Similarly, “doing well by doing good” – enhancing your firm’s financial performance by achieving superior corporate social responsibility – is often easier said than done. When confronted with an ethical decision – e.g. whether to dump toxic waste in a developing country, where it may not be illegal, when all your competitors do so as well – sometimes it will cost you (a lot of) money to do the right thing. Dozens of academic studies have tried to establish a positive link between corporate social performance and profitability, but for every study that finds a (modest) positive correlation, there is one that doesn’t.
But it seems some organizations do pull it off.
Take the company Aravind Eye Care in India. It was founded in 1976 specifically to provide cataract eye surgery. They modeled their operations on McDonalds: high volume, highly efficient operations, based on division of labor and cost efficiency. It is a very profitable operation; the company has a gross margin of 50 percent. Yet, the remarkable thing is that they treat 70 percent of their customers for free. The 30 percent that do pay are relatively affluent people who can afford the operation, but who receive pretty much the same service. In fact, the company goes out of its way to actively recruit non-paying customers. It goes to look for them systematically in the countryside and transports them to their clinics for free.
This, while the clinical quality of their service – the cataract operation – is second to none. Similarly, other medical clinics are operating in India – for instance in heart surgery – that combine extremely efficient, low-cost operations, but at very high quality in terms of clinical outcome. To such an extent that various National Health Service hospitals in the United Kingdom are considering sending their patients to India; to save money, while providing them with superior quality treatment.
How can these organizations combine higher quality with lower costs? How can they combine doing well by doing good, and treat 70 percent of patients for free at 50 percent gross margins? The trick is that their business models are built for the long-term. Paradoxically, in the long-run, the lower costs enable them to provide better quality.
Ask yourself this: Could Aravind Eye Care make more money if it did not treat the 70 percent non-paying patients? Although it may seem that this would save them a lot of costs, in fact, the answer is very likely “no”. Every organization learns with experience. We call this effect “the learning curve”. With experience, firms increase the efficiency and quality of their production. These curves have been documented for airplanes, cars, bottles, pizzas, and so on. And cataract eye surgery is no exception.
It is because these clinics treat such very large number of patients, the company runs down its learning curve very quickly, giving it a substantial competitive advantage. Moreover, the vast number of patients enables it to divide labor to the extreme, creating specialist roles and highly-experienced people in all parts of the procedure. The 70 percent non-paying customers form the basis of this advantage. Consequently, the company would likely not be able to attract the 30 percent paying customers without them.
It is often said that Aravind’s paying customers subsidize the 70 percent that get the operation for free, yet, in many ways, it is the other way around: Treating the vast numbers of non-paying patients enables the company to deliver the quality that attracts the ones that do pay.
What enables companies such as Aravind to combine all of these things? Didn’t I say at the beginning of this piece that “when something seems too good to be true, it usually is?” and that “it is always a good habit to explicitly ask what might it not be good for?” Yes, but that is because there is a second question you should always ask, when considering a particular management technique, practice, or strategy, and that is “what might its long-term effects be?” What might seem a good idea in the short-run does not always work in the long term – and vice versa. Unfortunately, most companies make decisions based on their short-term consequences, because that is what they can see and measure. If, like Aravind, you optimize your business model for the long haul, you might be able to deliver superior quality at lower costs. And even do some good for society in the process.
Which company will win the battle for smartphone dominance in 2014? The latest data, released last week, showed Apple leading in the US (42% share), with Samsung ahead in the UK (58% share) and indeed most other markets. Others (notably Microsoft and Blackberry) are struggling to get a look-in.
Why do we talk about the battle for “dominance” in smartphones? In most industries – cars, financial services, soap powders — we expect to see large numbers of competing companies, often with quite similar market shares. But in the high-tech world, it is quite normal for one company to completely dominate – think of Intel in microprocessors, Cisco in routers, or Microsoft in personal computing software.
These high-tech markets have three distinctive features that allow the strong to get stronger. First, they are characterised by what economists call network effects - the idea that something becomes more valuable when more people use it. Think for example of the exponential growth of Facebook, which became more attractive the more people signed up. It’s the same with game developers – they all want to put their apps on the iStore because it has the most users, which in turn helps it to attract more users.
Second, there are significant switching costs between products, and customer get locked-in. If I want to trade in my Dell laptop for an Apple machine, I can expect many days of grief as I get used to the subtle differences between the two operating systems. If I want to change my soap powder, or even buy a different brand of car, the costs of switching are much lower.
Third, the value in high-tech products is mostly in the software, and the neat thing about software is that the variable cost of making it is zero. So once Apple has developed its new operating system, it has an incentive to get it into as many people’s hands as possible: whatever they pay goes straight to the bottom line.
Put these three points together, and it’s easy to see how some markets end up being completely dominated by one company, with the strong getting stronger and the marginal players being elbowed aside. And of course it isn’t necessarily the “best” product that wins in this world: VHS pushed out Betamax in the video tape market, and Microsoft dominated Apple in PC operating systems; both cases where the inferior product won out.
All of which helps to explain the strategies we see the smartphone companies using to gain control of their market. The operating system (Android, iOS, Windows) is the heart of the product, so to attract more users onto their system they are building “ecosystems” of suppliers, app developers, and mobile operators around it. They are also seeking to control their channels to secure their market share – hence Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia, and Google’s acquisition of Motorola.
So what will happen to the smartphone industry in 2014? There is no way back for Blackberry or other lesser operating systems like Symbian. But in terms of overall winners, history doesn’t tend to repeat itself exactly. The switching costs between smartphone operating systems are falling, so we may end up with two or three players coexisting with each other. And there is another lesson from the PC industry that we shouldn’t forget, namely that the “open” architecture created by Microsoft, Intel and IBM ultimately attracted more followers than the “closed” system of Apple.
So here is my prediction: the Android operating system will continue to grow (through Symbian, LG, HTC and Motorola), because it increasingly does everything Apple can do, and at a lower cost to users and app developers. Apple will retain a loyal but gradually dwindling customer base – it will continue to be cool, but its best days are behind it. And what about Microsoft? Just as it did with the XBox, I expect Microsoft will continue to throw money at the problem, gradually building up sufficient market share to become a profitable third player.
High-tech markets like smartphones don’t follow the traditional rules of competition – they operate according to the logic of “increasing returns” to scale, where the strong get stronger. By understanding these different rules, you can make much better sense of the strategies of companies like Apple, Google and Microsoft.
The well-known dictum “I know that half of my budget is wasted, but I’m not sure which half” was attributed – depending on the side of the Atlantic – to Lord Leverhulme (Unilever’s founder) or John Wanamaker (father of the department store) as they pondered the challenge posed by their advertising budget. Advancements in Ad Tech have alleviated such concerns from the Chief Marketing Officer agenda. Yet, they remain front and centre in today’s C-suite. CEOs and senior executives face a similar dilemma; How can my firm successfully pursue innovation? And specifically, where and how should I allocate my innovation budget?
A new strategy, corporate venturing, offers a way forward. Increasingly, large corporations balance entrepreneurship and strategy by turning to innovative start-ups. Why start-ups? Simply put, entrepreneurial ventures contribute a growing fraction of current day innovation. This can be attributed to a number of trends. Highly creative and/or technically sophisticated individuals are seeking the entrepreneurial career path. It is an attractive first job for the millennium generation, and a viable second career to more experienced talent. Also, the cost of starting a business is falling due to favourable technological and regulatory environment. Together, these trends lead to a growth in the number of start-ups, and importantly, the innovative potential they afford.
Which begs the question; How can an established firm harness innovative start-ups? There are at least three approaches to corporate venturing. First, consider the BBC Worldwide investment in Viki.com, a Singapore-based venture which, by crowd-sourcing a community of passionate fans, offers a variety of the world’s TV and movies translated into multiple languages. The BBC Worldwide, along with its 2011 investment, licensed 270 hours of programmes to Viki. Within a few weeks it was translated by thousands of enthusiasts into several major Asian languages. The outcome not only brought down the language barriers, but also resulted in winning distributors’ attention and opening up new markets faster and more efficiently.
The second approach is about a systematic scan of the entrepreneurial landscape. Consider Coca Cola’s Venturing & Emerging Brands (VEB) unit. Since 2007, it has been investing in nascent brands in North America, reviewing 150 to 200 brands each year. Matthew Mitchell, director of business development, explained what does success look like for VEB; “By identifying trends early on, we are reducing our total overall investment costs.” He notes that Coke’s 2007 acquisition of Glaceau Vitaminwater was a powerful transaction for the company, but it begged the question, “What if we could have identified the opportunity three or four years earlier?”
The final corporate venturing approach has to do with proactively growing an ecosystem. Intel Capital is a case in point. Earlier this year, it launched a $100M Perceptual Computing Fund. The objective is to accelerate the development of software and applications that enable natural and immersive human-computer interactions. Intel’s first experience with growing an ecosystem dates back at least to 1999, with the launch of the Intel 64 Fund. It leveraged capital from Intel and other firms, and supported hardware and software businesses that took advantage of the Intel 64-bit Architecture. The 64 Fund assisted in realizing the value proposition Intel’s 64-bit Architecture offered potential customers and thus accelerated demand growth. Notably, it achieved all that by drawing only in part on Intel’s own budget.
To conclude, corporate venturing charts a new approach to directing innovation efforts and budgets. One that harnesses innovative start-ups. It is adopted across a wide set of industries, and enables incumbent firms to balance corporate strategy entrepreneurship.
For his Phd thesis at Harvard, Clark Gilbert tried to understand why some newspaper companies were successful in responding to the internet while others failed. He found that those companies that viewed the internet as a threat ended up failing in their response. Surprisingly, those that succeeded in their response did not view the internet as an opportunity. Instead, they saw it as both a threat and an opportunity: http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/2967.html. Doing so allowed them to create the sense of urgency required to generate action but also to approach the task strategically and proactively.
This is just one of the many studies available which show that how we view or frame something can have a big impact on what we do (and how successful we are in our actions). And that is why it makes a big difference how we frame one of the key issues facing the modern corporation, namely: “what is the goal or purpose of the modern corporation?”
One view, proposed by people in Finance is that the purpose of the modern corporation is to maximize shareholder value. Another view, coming primarily from people in Strategy is that the purpose of business is not to maximize shareholder value. Instead, it is to create great products and services that satisfy customers’ needs and in the process improve the state of our world. The argument is that if we focus our attention on creating superb products and services that the world needs, then as a by-product of that, we will also maximize profits. Thus, maximizing profits is not an end in itself—it is a by-product of something else. Look, for example, at Steve Jobs. He is the one CEO that created more value for shareholders than anybody else. Yet, he never once said that his goal is to maximize shareholder value. No. What he aimed to achieve was radical new products that made our life better. As a result, we bought his products. As a result, he made a lot of money.
People in Finance usually respond to such arguments by suggesting that while they accept the need to produce superb products and services, this should not be the focus of the corporation. Instead, it should be a by-product of something else. Specifically, they propose that the modern corporation should focus on maximizing shareholder value and as by-product of this we will produce superb products and services. So the essence of the disagreement boils down to this—do we focus on producing superb products and services and as a by-product of this maximize shareholder value? OR do we focus on maximizing shareholder value and as a by-product of this produce superb products and services?
The difference may appear academic but as we saw above, how you frame something has a big impact on what people do. So the question we need to ask ourselves is the following: “If we frame the goal of business as maximizing shareholder value, can we see managers doing things that may maximize shareholder value which are at the same time unethical and/or illegal?” (such as selling unnecessary products—say financial derivatives—to uninformed customers?) The answer to this is yes! By contrast, “if we frame the goal of business as producing superb products and services that make the world a better place, can we see managers doing illegal and unethical things in an effort to achieve this?” It’s hard to see how!
And that is why it is important that we win the academic debate on what the purpose of business really is. It is not to maximize shareholder value but to make the world a better place for everybody (through its products and services). That has always been the purpose of business but somehow we lost sight of it along the way. If we put this goal at the forefront of business, then we will succeed in focusing the attention of millions on what matters most—improving the state of our world for everybody.
More than two hundred years ago, a class of 10-year old German students were asked by their teacher to solve a seemingly difficult problem: “If you add all the numbers from 1 to 100, what is the sum total?” Most of us will probably do a search on Google to find the answer to such a problem. But one of those ten year old kids came up with the answer really quick. Instead of adding the numbers linearly (1+2+3+4 and so on), he added them as follows: (1+100 = 101); (2+99 = 101); (3+98 = 101). He quickly realized that he had 50 pairs, each adding up to 101. So the answer is 50 X 101 = 5050. That little kid turned out to be the biggest mathematician that Germany ever produced. His name was Gauss.
The question is: “did Gauss think creatively about his task? Did he innovate?” The answer, obviously, is yes. But why was he so creative? Was it because we asked him to think outside the box or to think creatively? Was it because we asked him to be innovative? Obviously not! The simple answer is that Gauss was creative because in trying to tackle a really difficult task, he quickly realised that he could not do it by using the standard methodology or the standard way of doing things (which was adding the numbers linearly). He therefore questioned the way he was trying to solve the problem. By questioning his methodology, he was able to think of another way (i.e. another methodology) to solve his difficult problem.
This example has immediate applicability in business. We will not get innovation in companies by asking people to be innovative or by encouraging them to think outside the box! What we must do instead is to first give people a really difficult task (say a stretch goal) and then (and more importantly) “sell” it to them to win emotional commitment for it. If they really bought into the goal, they will attempt to achieve it. But they will quickly realise that they cannot achieve such a stretch goal by simply using their old ways of doing business. They will, therefore, begin to question their ways of doing business (like Gauss). Out of this questioning will, hopefully, come new and innovative ways of operating that will allow us to achieve this stretch goal. The key to all this is that people “buy into” the stretch goal. And nobody will buy into anything until we actively “sell” it to them to win their emotional commitment.
All this suggests that innovation is not an end in itself. It is, instead, a by-product of something else. And that something else is the active questioning that comes about when our people are trying to achieve a really stretch goal that they have really bought into. If you don’t believe me, just read the biography of Steve Jobs.
Strategic decisions often have long-term consequences – in fact, that might be the reason we consider them “strategic” in the first place. Sometimes, organisations have to accept some short-term pain for long-term gain. In a way, any investment is like that. However, conversely, certain decisions with short-term gain can also have more painful consequences in the long-run. The problem is that managers often see the short-term benefits – and that’s what they base their decisions on – but they are unaware of the potential long-term negative effects.
For example, together with Mihaela Stan from University College London, I conducted a large research project on IVF clinics in the UK. These fertility clinics are obliged to publish their success rates (number of treatments that lead to a birth), for the sake of “transparency” and “consumer choice”. However, in response, many of them started to select their patients: patients with a good prognosis are welcome everywhere, but quite a few clinics refuse patients with a poor prognosis, in order not to mess up their success rates. Mihaela Stan and I found that this practice works – at least in the short-run – in the sense that clinics that are more selective enjoyed higher success rates.
However, what these clinics are not aware of is that they also learn a lot from treating difficult patients. When we computed the so-called “learning curves” of all the clinics in the business, we discovered that the ones that did treat a relatively large number of poor-prognosis cases improved their overall success over time quite dramatically. In fact, they learned so much from these difficult patients – in terms of new innovative processes, tests, and techniques – that, after a year or so, they overtook the clinics that thought they were being clever by doing easy cases only. That is, their success rates in fact became significantly higher – in spite of treating more difficult patients! Hence, the selective clinics – in the long run – shot themselves in the foot.
The problem is, clinics are not aware of these detrimental long-term consequences of their actions. Sure, they see that their success rates might be lagging behind some of their competitors’, but what they have trouble understanding is that “that’s because some years ago we started selecting only easy patients”. Therefore, they usually just continue with the practice, or become even more selective, in a futile attempt to turn the tide.
Similarly, process management systems (such as ISO9000 or SixSigma) have been shown to have detrimental long-term effects (because they harm long-term innovation); likewise for downsizing programmes (which lead to bad employee morale, low commitment and increased employee turnover), some outsourcing practices, and so on. Generally, management practices and strategies have advantages and disadvantages; different short-term and long-term consequences. Thinking that something only has benefits is usually rather naïve and unrealistic. When considering a strategic decision, it is always important to ask “what might be the long-term consequences?” And perhaps then you will open the door for that difficult customer.
Here are a couple slides excerpted from recent discussions of the Whatsapp acquisition. (The acquisition happened to hit, as I was in the middle of teaching classes on economics and strategy of digital multi-sided platforms.)
I hope these might be helpful in pointing out the woeful limitations of counting eyeballs, looking at historical cash flows, etc.